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THE PROBLEM OF COORDINATING PRICE AND WAGE
PROGRAMS IN 1950-1953
PART It
JOHN H.

III.

KAUFMANNt

PRICE AND WAGE PROGRAM COORDINATION

The price-wage freeze of January, 1951, was a temporary expedient to put a stop to the rising price-wage spiral. It was not possible
nor desirable to consider the freeze an eduring program. Both the price
and wage agencies were immediately forced to fashion programs which
achieved their own program objectives. The Economic Stabilization
Agency had the responsibility of assuring that these programs were
effective and compatible while, at the same time, affording both business
and labor an adequate incentive to achieve maximum production.
Immediately following the freeze both OPS and WSB had the
difficult task of determining the level at which prices and wages should
be stabilized, as well as determining the stringency with which the program should be administered to maintain this determined level. Both
of these questions required the highest skills of seeking, within the limits
of the Act, a balance of the economic, political, administrative, and social
factors affecting the program.
The price and wage programs were developed to fit the pressing
economic factors. The index of prices had reached its highest level of
history, and there were gross distortions and inequities obscured within
the average price and wage levels. While wages in some industries had
kept up with rapidly rising prices in the late summer and fall of 1950, it
was estimated that as many as half of all wage and salary workers had
not participated in a general wage rate or salary rate adjustment. Furthermore, it was recognized that consumer prices could not be held at the
level of the freeze despite intensive price control efforts. Not only were
there glaring holes in the price control authority (agricultural commodities in particular) but the price increases at wholesale levels, which
t Part I of this article appears at 29 IND. L.J. 499.
:tA.B., Swarthmore College, 1940; M.P.A., Harvard University, 1947; Ph.D.,
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could not be rolled back, would necessarily eventually reflect themselves
72
at the retail level.

In the spring of 1951 both price and wage agencies were seeking to
establish by summer an equitable level or plateau of control which could
be firmly held as inflationary pressures mounted from the expanding
defense program, which represented as little as seven percent of the
national product in December, 1950, but which was expected to go to
eighteen percent by the end of the year. This had to be achieved with
limited stabilization authority and with the major organized labor and
business organizations on record against direct controls.
A. Establishment of Price Policy
Although the voluntary pricing standards of December 19, 1950,
warned sellers that future controls would be established using a December
1 level of prices, by the time of the freeze at the end of January this had
become an impossibility. Had only a few prices risen above this level
they could have probably been rolled back as some were, but price increases were far more general and so imbedded in the price structure
that a price level base of a later date had to be sought and the serious
inequities adjusted. The price-cost distortions were caused by the fact
that prices and costs did not rise at the same rate or at the same time;
many sellers more than anticipated their current and future cost increases
and reflected them in their prices, while others complied more nearly with
the voluntary standards. In addition, there were wide disparities in marketing situations where some sellers sold on the basis of long term contracts while others sold on the basis of daily quotations.
Thus the OPS was faced with the problem of eliminating the pricecost distortions between sellers while at the same time holding as closely
as possible to the general price level established by the freeze. To make
this adjustment, as well as holding such a price line, two complementary
standards were developed: an interim pricing standard which would
permit the removal of these disparities and inequities, and a basic longrun policy of holding prices at established levels as long as earnings were
above some reasonable minimum.
The interim pricing policy attempted to reconstruct the price structure by utilizing a pre-Korea base and allowing the newly computed prices
72.

At the beginning of February, 1951, for example, it was feared that by July,

1951, the consumer price index would rise about seven percent over December, 1950, assuming (1) effective price control, (2) necessary pass-through to retail of price increases at primary and wholesale level, (3) no change in rent control, (4) the rise of
agricultural commodities to parity levels, and (5) the continuation of imported material
prices at close to freeze levels. Consumer prices from December to July did in fact
rise about four percent.
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to reflect only actual direct labor and cost increases occurring since then. 3
During its development, it was anticipated that this regulation and its
major companion regulations" would have the effect of reducing the
many prices that had been raised beyond mere reflection of actual increases
in costs yet would also allow manufacturers to raise other prices which
had been caught inequitably in the freeze. On balance, however, it was
expected that the reductions would be larger than the increases because
most manufacturers had taken a mark-up on the cost increases experienced since Korea, while the regulation allowed for none.
For distributors the interim pricing policy was to establish mark-ups
at the pre-Korea level (a dollar-and-cent margin, rather than a percentage
mark-up) to be added to the inventory price. For food commodities, distributive and processing margins were established on the same basis as
the general manufacturing and distributive policy, but allowance had to
be made for a pass-through for farm products where their prices were
below parity.
While the Office of Price Stabilization worked diligently on the
preparation of the manufacturer's interim price policy regulation, it was
not until April 25, three months after the freeze, that it was issued. 5 The
OPS had attempted to make the basic regulation as fair and equitable as
possible, and this required time and also posed a dilemma. The more
equitable the regulation, the longer it took to prepare and the more complicated it became, with each manufacturer finally given a choice of one
of four methods of calculation. However, the longer it took to prepare
the longer the inequities of the freeze had to be endured. Despite pressure from ESA, the interim regulations were not issued by OPS until
the end of April.
In issuing CPR 22, DiSalle emphasized that the agency was not
adopting a cost-plus principle in establishing ceilings. He said:
73. Specifically, for manufacturers, each was instructed in Ceiling Price Regulation 22, April 25, 1951, to find for his commodities the highest unit price charged in a
pre-Korea base period of three months and to the pre-Korea price add the increase in
the unit factory labor cost between June 24, 1950, and March 15, 1951, as well as the
unit increase in materials cost which he experienced from June 24, 1950, to December 31,
1950. And some imported material cost increases were allowed through March 15, 1951.
Manufacturers were required, however, to absorb increases for general administration,
sales, advertising, research, plant expansion and improvement, and overtime pay. CPR
No. 22, April 25, 1951, 16 FED. REG. 3562 (1951).
74. CPR No. 30, May 4, 1951, 16 FED. REG. 4108 (1951) and CPR No. 45, June 9,
1951, 16 FED. REG. 5753 (1951).
75. CPR No. 7, the distributor's regulation, was issued on February 26, 1951. 16
CPR Nos. 14, 15, 16, the food regulations, were issued on March
FED. REG. 1872 (1951).
28, 1951. 16 FED. REG. 2725, 2735, and 2750 (1951). And CPR No. 30, Revision 1 to
CPR 18, CPR Nos. 37, and 45 were issued May 4, 9, 16 and June 15 respectively. 16
FED. REG. 4108, 4327, 4644, and 5753 (1951).
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This regulation allows only for past increases, and it does
nzot carry any implications that any future cost increases will be
handled on a similar automatic basis.
It would be completely futile to attempt price control on a
cost-plus basis, for it would result in prices spiraling upward.
If each material and labor cost could be passed along immediately and automatically, it would mean higher production costs,
higher prices for finished products and thus raise living costs.
That would result in demands for new wage increases and still
higher production costs.
In short, we cannot successfully stabilize prices if we per76
mit automatic escalation.
These interim price regulations were directed at correcting the pricecost distortions caught in the freeze. A further basic regulation was
needed to hold the price level once the distortions were corrected. This
was established by the Industry Earnings Standard which was the basic
long-range policy of requiring manufacturers to absorb future cost increases without raising prices if they were in a favorable profit position.
Johnston noted in a letter to DiSalle that: "[t]he basic policy shall be
to allow no price increase above the levels set by interim regulations except
to the minimum extent required by law, or for exceptional reasons of
public policy."
The Defense Production Act, in Section 402 (c), merely required
that regulations be "fair and equitable and . . . effectuate the purposes
of this title." Johnston established that this minimum requirement
would be met for any industry other than certain farm and food commodities, if:
. . . the dollar profits of the industry amount to 85 per
cent of the average for the industry's best three years during the
period 1946-1949, inclusive. The profits should be figured
before federal income and excess profits taxes and after normal
depreciation only, with adjustments made for any changes in
net worth.
Any increase in manufacturing or processing prices may
not be passed along at distributive levels except to the extent
necessary (a) to meet the above earnings standard; or (b) to
prevent dislocations in the relationship between costs and ceiling
prices; or (c) to avoid serious hardships or inequities or to
76. Press Release, OPS-0-94, April 25, 1951.
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preserve enforceability. Any such increases shall not, in
general, exceed the actual dollars-and-cents rise in costs. 7
While the Industry Earnings Standard directly resembled its OPA
predecessor in form, it was in one regard a great deal less severe in substance. The OPA earnings standard, also following the excess profits
law base, used the years 1936 to 1939-years which reflected fairly
normal profits after lean years of the depression. The 1946-1949 period
of the Johnston standard were levels of comparatively high profits,
estimated at the time to represent for manufacturing industries a rate of
return on net worth before taxes of 23 percent. The return on net
worth before taxes for manufacturing corporations in the OPS base
period averaged only 9.9 percent.7
It was difficult for the argument
to be made generally that the Johnston standard was not quite liberal
and therefore not generally "fair and equitable."
However, since the profits before taxes for the first quarter of 1951
were at the record high annual rate of $50.1 billions for all private corporations, compared to a range of $23.5 to $39.6 billions during the years
1946 to 1950, there was a significant cost absorption gap for most industries. Only a few individual manufacturing industries were operating
at profits below earnings standard levels;7" most manufacturing industries were far above the standard."0 Thus these latter industries because
of relatively low base period earnings and high current earnings had a
tremendous amount of cost absorptive capacity under the Industry
Earnings Standard before any price increase could be granted. In the
spring of 1952, a year after the Industry Earnings Standard was established, the high cost absorptive capacity of the steel industry was to become a national issue.
The pricing standards developed in the spring of 1951 were aimed
at achieving the freeze level of prices at wholesale with a reflection of
the past cost increases at retail, maintaining pre-Korea margins, and requiring absorption for any future cost increases up to the Industry Earnings Standard. These standards were the most stringent which either
ESA or OPS believed possible to establish. As will be noted, standards
with this degree of stringency were not viable, for Congress, in the 1951
amendments of the Act, relaxed them. But at the time they were devised
they appeared to be the most viable within the limits of law and the public
77. Letter, Johnston to DiSalle, April 21, 1951, ESA files.
78. Compare memorandum, Johnson to Johnston, Fairness of the Base Period in the
Earnings Standard,May 10, 1951, ESA files.
79. E.g., the food and beverage, apparel, and printing industries.
80. E.g., the transportation equipment, primary non-ferrous, primary iron and steel
industries.
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acceptance of controls. They were less severe than those of World War
II, yet Eric Johnston wrote Wilson that he believed the pricing policies
and standards were "tough and highly restrictive, and that they will have
an increasing impact on the level of corporate profits. They can be
justified on grounds of law and equity, only as a part of a firm stabilization program which has comparatively restrictive effect on other economic groups."'"
B. Development of Wage Policy
Even before the price-wage freeze, and certainly shortly thereafter,
Eric Johnston found that necessary as it was to establish programs of
comparable restrictiveness, it was far more easily said than done. Johnston, wishing to avoid some of the apparent difficulties of his predecessor,
requested as a condition precedent to his acceptance that he be allowed to
establish an advisory board having representation of top level business,
labor, agricultural, and public members and that he also be allowed to
report directly to the President. With an advisory board and direct access to the President, Johnston believed he could better establish and
administer a stabilization program in all of its interlocking parts. However, he was never granted either of his requests. Although he did
establish his own advisory board of lower echelon representation while a
national advisory board was established by ODM, he did not get the
direct access to the President which he desired and felt necessary in order
to deal authoritatively with business and labor, as well as to bring his influence to bear on the other economic controls basic to the success of the
direct controls program, namely, tax, credit, savings, and expenditure
programs. He was limited right from the start more than he had expected to be, and from the start he was to be blessed with another problem-a tripartite wage board.
Johnston had no desire or intention of keeping the Wage Stabilization Board as a captive advisory committee on wages as Valentine had
planned. This was borne out by his immediate delegation of authority
the day he assumed office. However, Johnston assumed that with his
responsibility for direct price and wage control went an authority which
he intended to wield. He looked to the OPS and WSB as constituent
agencies having broad delegations of operating authority but ones which
would seek" approval on all major policy issues and would carry out other
policy decisions which he might direct. He conceived of himself by desire
and by requirement of law far more of hfi administrator over price and
.81.

Memorandum, Johnston to Wilson, Outlle of Price Control Policies, April 4,

4, 1951, ESA files.

-..
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wage controls than did the Directors of the Office of Economic Stabilization in World War II. The OES in World War II was an "appellate"
agency to which OPA and NWLB brought conflicting problems. Johnston viewed the Defense Production Act as requiring him to see that these
problems would not arise or at least that they be nipped in the bud before
flowering into national issues.82
Undoubtedly the first price-wage coordinating difficulty Johnston
had was launching the price-wage freeze. DiSalle readily issued the
General Ceiling Price Regulation, and Johnston signed it also to signify
his wholehearted approval. The Wage Stabilization Board, however,
showed no desire to approve the General Wage Stabilization Regulation
establishing the freeze, although it did not oppose it. Labor members
were dissatisfied with the organizational layers between the WSB and
the President, and since they were still hoping that the WSB could be
made more directly responsible to the President, they showed no interest
in taking any action which implicitly recognized the current organizational relationship. Furthermore, the labor members believed that if the
freeze order was promulgated from above it would leave them in a better
position with their rank and file and enable them to criticize more freely
the development of wage policy. Similarly, the industry members of the
Board shied away from voting for the wage freeze order since this implicitly connoted agreement with the price freeze which business organizations had specifically opposed. For these reasons the tripartite board
would not vote for the wage freeze. This was the first of a series of
instances in which Johnston found the Wage Stabilization Board refusing
to take actions known to be necessary and inevitable but which were
embarrassing or awkward. The WSB found Johnston a useful "fall
guy" in such situations. Johnston had to issue the wage freeze himself
in order to have it go into effect as of January 25, 1951, simultaneously
with the price freeze.
All the inequities growing out of the turbulent movements of 1950
were caught in the wage freeze, just as in the case of the price freeze.
While the general pattern of collective bargaining wage increases was in
the range of five to eight percent over the year, among organized workers
increases of at least ten percent had been negotiated in basic steel, coal,
northern textiles, footwear, aluminum, and some other industries of
lesser importance. While these larger wage increases were obtained by
perhaps no more than two million organized workers, they set a firm
82.

Compare

JOHNSTON PERIOD
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37 ff. (unpublished manuscript in ODM Library, 1953).
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pattern. Furthermore, the ten percent increase in wage rates did not
include the value of pension plans and other supplementary benefits.
In addition to the distortions in the wage rate movements in 1950
were the difficult problems of automatic cost-of-living clauses and annual
productivity clauses in contracts. About 1.5 million workers were
covered by cost-of-living escalation clauses in some 500 contracts at the
time of the freeze. About 1.6 million employees were covered by contracts calling for general wage increases to be made after January 25,
1951, of which one million were under contract to receive these annual
improvement increases prior to June 30, 1951, and of these workers
about 650,000 were under clauses similar to the General Motors contract
under which a four cent an hour increase was due on May 29, 1951.83
There were, of course, other pressing problems requiring the Board's
early attention, including hardship and inequity increases, health, welfare,
and pension plans, to say nothing of the issue of the disputes function.
Immediately after the freeze, however, the issue was how to allow "catchup," relax the rigidities of the freeze, and yet establish the tightest wage
stabilization policy which could be maintained and supported by the industry, labor, and public members of the Board.
The catch-up issue posed basic questions. What would be the proper
catch-up base date, and how large an increase should be given to bring the
wage structure into alignment? Should this increase also cover future
cost of living, productivity, and fringe benefits? Also there was the
inevitable dilemma in wage stabilization of establishing a regulation
which, while a "ceiling" for the wage leaders, would tend to be regarded
as a "government sponsored goal" for others, strengthening the collective
bargaining position of workers employed at rates below the "ceiling."
While the WSB struggled with these questions there was a growing
dissatisfaction in organized labor's ranks regarding the part which they
were playing in the mobilization effort. This dissatisfaction was dramatically displayed when labor walked off the WSB. No one specific
issue caused the walkout; a complex of dissatisfactions existed. The
United Labor Policy Committee believed that the Wage Stabilization
Board should not have been smothered under the organizational hierarchy of ESA and ODM before reaching the President; it believed that
labor was not being given a significant part to play in formulating
mobilization policy, and it was particularly concerned by the reasons and
implications in transferring the Labor-Manpower Commission from the
Department of Labor to the Office of Defense Mobilization. They
83.

Compare memorandum (unsigned), Wage Policy and Problems, April, 1951,

ESA General Files.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
feared this transfer, rather than specifically opposing it, because Wilson,
who directed it, would give no satisfactory reasons for the move. Labor
had not been pleased with the Wilson appointment and furthermore saw
General Clay as one of his close advisers. Labor clearly remembered
Clay's position in 1944 behind the National Service Law proposal,
which they had strongly opposed.
The public and industry members of the Board, on February 15,
recommended to the Administrator that wage increases up to ten percent
over levels prevailing on January 15, 1950, should be allowed without
prior approval by the WSB, and that any fringe benefits negotiated in
the future should be included in the allowable ten percent limit. While
there was no substantial difference of position between the industry and
labor members, the three labor members dissented vigorously. The
labor members of the Board had a substitute recommendation of a twelve
percent increase over January 15, 1950, and less restrictive language
on particular points. The two percent difference of position on the
recommendation was not the full reason for the labor members walking
off the Board. When leaving the Board they claimed that the ten percent recommendation had, ". . . restrictive and harsh provisions . . .
[placing] the primary burden of sacrifice involved in current mobilization effort on only one segment of the population, those who depend
upon wages and salaries for their living. There is no single provision
in the Regulation which is responsible for this result. Rather, the entire
tenor of the Regulation is one of harsh restriction."84
Johnston held the ten percent catch-up recommendation for almost
two weeks, attempting to find a means of reestablishing the Board. He
was unsuccessful because he was trying to buck a labor tide of reaction
far more significant than this issue, and on February 27 he accepted the
recommendation. On February 28, the United Labor Policy Committee staged a full walkout on the government, by withdrawing all labor
representation from government mobilization organizations.
In approving the tei percent catch-up (Wage Regulation No. 6),
Johnston outlined to Cyrus Ching, Chairman of the non-functioning
Wage Board, his concept of the development of wage policy and the
part which Regulation 6 should play. Regulation 6, Johnston noted, was
a necessary first step in evolving a step-by-step, rounded wage policy
which could handle equitably the complexities of the problem and simul84. Dissenting Opinion of Labor Members of WSB concerning Regulation 6, February 20, 1951, signed by Harry C. Bates, Elmer E. Walker, and Emil Rieve, reprinted
in Wage StabilizationProgram, i95o-1953, appendix at 63.
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taneously achieve the objective of wage stabilization. Johnston wrote
Ching that in evolving this policy the Board must be fair yet stringent.85
An equitable policy which would share the burden of defense should
include, Johnston wrote, a wage policy permitting automatic escalator
clauses in existing contracts to operate until June 30, 1951, even though
they might pierce the Regulation 6 limits. Similarly, clauses in existing
contracts providing annual wage increases in recognition of increased
productivity should be allowed to take effect until June 30, 1951. He
requested the Board to prepare regulations to carry out this policy.
Furthermore, Johnston asked the Board to study and recommend to
him regulations covering fringe benefits, hardships and inequities, new
plants, exempt industries, and tandem wage adjustment.8 6
By this letter Johnston hoped to make Regulation 6 more acceptable
to labor so as to resurrect the tripartite board, and lay a basis for wage
stabilization policy commensurate with the stringency of price and other
stabilization efforts. Firmly believing that a tripartite wage board was
the most effective method in our democratic society of administering
wage stabilization, Johnston sought for two months to find the combination of factors which would make the Board work and still have a
stabilization policy worthy of the name. It appeared that labor participation on the Board could only be obtained if the wage matters coming
before the Board were to be dealt with quite "liberally." Pressing
issues, such as the wool, cotton, meatpacking, railroads, and shipyards
cases up for decision, forced an immediate position to be taken. In
light of the coal agreement which sneaked in under the freeze, it appeared difficult to deny, on equity grounds, the increases in other important cases. To deny them, it appeared, would mean no labor participation; to grant them would mean no stopping of the "sixth round" of
wage increases and a possibility of the withdrawal of industry members
from the Board. Labor continually pointed to the looseness of controls
on farm prices, prices for manufactured goods, and credit, as well as
85. In his letter he observed: "We can't hope to go on doing things in the usual
way. Each of us must give up something. Each of us must practice self-discipline and
self-restraint. That is the only way we can halt the inflationary disease eating at our

economic vitals.
"Certainly we can't stabilize the economy if different segments race for advantage,
and first one and then another shoots ahead of the rest. Our job in this Agency is to
see that the burden is shared as equitably as possible on the principle of equality of
sacrifice." Letter, Johnston to Ching, February 27, 1951, ESA files.
86. Because the Board was not functioning, Johnston found it necessary on
March 1 to issue Wage Regulation No. 8, himself, which embodied his first policy
recommendation, i.e., allowing the automatic cost-of-living escalation clauses that were
in effect on January 25, 1951, to function until June 30, 1951. GWR No. 8, March 1,
1951, 16 FED. REG. 2032 (1951).
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inequitable taxes as reasons why their position was "equitable" with the
other action being taken in the stabilization program. Thus it seemed that
a wage program not approving the recently negotiated wage increases but
only giving partial support to them, would possibly be acceptable to
organized labor only if accompanied by tighter price regulations, such as
strict maintenance of freeze level for manufactured goods prices and
farm parity levels, along with a broad program of inflation control.
In a period of "half-mobilization" could the Administration gather
the support of Congress and the people to back such a stabilization program in its various parts? In March at a Defense Mobilization Board
meeting, Johnston raised the question of whether the American public
wanted stabilization. He noted a lack of willingness of any economic
segment of the country to hold the line at current levels despite such
favorable factors as high level of industrial profits, a liberal wage policy
for the vast majority of labor under the ten percent catch-up regulation,
above parity prices for many agricultural commodities, and general opposition to balancing the budget through higher taxes. "A general
situation exists," he observed, "in which nearly every group wants everybody else to be controlled but remains unwilling to accept controls imposed upon themselves.""
The Defense Mobilization Board agreed with Johnston that he had
only one course of action in current wage cases, that of holding the existing ceilings except where hardship or inequity was clearly evident.
The Board agreed that the stabilization program must be continued and
must be made effective. To accomplish this end it felt that the general
public had to be better acquainted with the need. Johnston outlined
five points as essential to an effective stabilization program: (1) a wage
freeze, probably as of July 1, 1951, (2) an agricultural parity frozen as
of January 15, 1951, (3) the sharp curtailment of business profits,
(4) a balanced budget, and (5) stricter credit controls. It was far easier
to conceive of this program as fair, equitable, compatible, and necessary
in the public interest than it was to get acceptance of it by Congress and
the powerful economic groups in society which would be affected by it.
C. Resurrection of WSB and Establishment of Disputes Function
On April 21, 1951, the Wage Stabilization Board was resurrected as
an eighteen man tripartite board with George Taylor as Chairman. It was
possible to reappoint the Board with labor representation only by making
provision for limited disputes authority for the Board. Unlike the
National War Labor Board which was established as a disputes settling
87. Minutes, Meeting No. 6, DMB, March 14, 1951.
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body in early 1942 after a labor-management conference and a no-strike
no-lockout pledge and which only later (in October 1942) was given
general wage stabilization authority, the Wage Stabilization Board
started with wage stabilization authority but no disputes authority and
no labor-management conference or pledge.
While authority existed for a labor-management conference, both
Johnston and Ching recognized that such a conference would neither
produce a no-strike no-lockout pledge nor aid in resurrecting the WSB.
The most that could be hoped for, it appeared, was a new Wage Board
with some disputes authority in which labor and management had representation and confidence so that it could settle disputes without interruption of defense production. If this could be achieved it was felt an implicit, partial, no-strike no-lockout understanding would eventually be
established.
The WSB was reestablished by Executive Order 10233 which gave
the Board authority to assume jurisdiction in any labor dispute which was:
. . . not resolved by collective bargaining or by the prior
full use of conciliation and mediation facilities and which
threatens an interruption of work affecting the national defense where:
(a) The parties to any such dispute jointly agree to submit such dispute to the Board for recommendation or decision,
if the Board agrees to accept such a dispute, or
(b) The President is of the opinion that the dispute is of
a character which substantially threatens the progress of national defense and refers such dispute to the Board.88
It is most important to note, in regard to the problem of price-wage
coordination, that labor had partially won their point of reducing the
distance between the Wage Stabilization Board and the President. The
Board was directed in Executive Order 10233 to report to the President
its recommendations as to "fair and equitable terms of settlement" on
any dispute which the President might have referred to the Board. Although the Executive Order required that any action taken by the Board
"be consistent with stabilization policies,"8 9 ii did not require that the
Board seek approval from the Economic Stabilization Administrator of
its recommendation before submission to the President. Thus the WSB
in establishing new wage stabilization policy was required to submit its
recommendations to. Johnston for approval, but in settling labor disputes
was accountable to the President and only under a moral obligation to
88. Exec. Order No. 10233, §405, 16

89. Id. §409.

FED.

REG. 3503 (1951).
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discuss the issue with Johnston if the settlement recommendation appeared to the Board to involve issues of new wage policy.
With the WSB having independent dispute functions for which it
was accountable directly to the President, the Economic Stabilization
Administrator lost the assurance of control over the stabilization policy
of the Board. It became possible for the Board to make a recommendation to the President inconsistent with stabilization objectives, yet over
which the Economic Stabilization Administrator had no veto authority.
The WSB, before the steel crisis, indignantly denied that this might
happen, saying:
It should be presumed that the Board, like any other government agency, will act within its authority . . . if the Board,

in order to arrive at a fair and equitable settlement in a disputes case, should find that some change in existing general
policies, or the adoption of a new general policy, is necessary
or desirable, it should not be presumed that the Chairman of
the Board will not consult with the Administrator in advance,
whether or not legally bound to do so."0
Yet if the Administrator was presented with a dispute settling
recommendation which was inconsistent with the stabilization program
he would be faced with the dilemma of readapting his stabilization program or finding a new Wage Stabilization Board and yet still be required
to live with the disputes recommendation once it was made public. Rollback of prices or wage levels or revocation of government decisions on
prices and wages have proven next to impossible once they have been
made public. The steel dispute recommendation presented this dilemma.
With the Wage Stabilization Board having disputes settling authority, Johnson recognized the added importance and need for the Board's
establishment of a total wage policy, the considerations of which he had
enumerated in his February 27 letter. During the summer of 1951,
however, he was to discover that the Board was not anxious to establish
a clear-cut definition of a total wage policy, maintaining that its ability
to perform its disputes function would be limited if all parties knew in
advance the maximum possible limits of any decision.
D.

Coordination in Establishing Direct Controls Program

While called the Economic Stabilization Administrator, Eric Johns90. Letter, Feinsinger to Putnam, January 11, 1952, ESA files, enclosing memoran-

dum, Groner, Legal Basis of the Administrator's and the Board's Duties and Responsibilities with Respect to Labor Disputes and Wage Stabilization, January 10, 1952, ESA
files. See also, testimony of Taylor, Hearings on H.R. 3871 Before the House SubCommittee on Labor and Public Welfare, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 18 (1951).
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ton had some influence but no control over other essential factors affecting economic stabilization. Not only did industrial production and tax,
credit, or fiscal programs affect the outcome of economic stabilization,
the action or lack of action in these areas affected the direct price and
wage programs in two ways: the less effective the other economic controls the greater the'pressure on and the need for price and wage controls,
yet, the less stringent these other controls, the more difficult it was on
equity grounds to establish stringent price and wage controls.
This was part of Johnston's problem in attempting to establish effective price and wage controls. However, there were other direct factors which affected the level and stringency at which price and wage
controls could be established. The level at which prices could be stabilized
was mainly a function of the degree to which increased costs since Korea
had become imbedded in the cost-price structure, the impossibility of any
general roll-back, and the degree of lack of control over agricultural and
imported commodity prices. While Johnston had authority to affect the
future movements of only some of these factors, it is certain that when
establishing the price program they were all given consideration. Establishing wholesale prices at the level of the freeze and allowing only preKorea mark-up was the most that could have been done, and, as it turned
out, was more than could be done in light of given factors beyond
Johnston's control.
There was greater choice in the matter of instituting a no further
cost pass-through and absorption policy. The Industry Earnings
Standard could have been placed on a more or less stringent basis, and
here Johnston had some opportunity to mold the degree of stringency of
price policy to wage and other stabilization standards.
In the development of wage policy there were similar factors which
established the lower, or most stringent, limits of wage policy, but on the
other hand, Johnston was less able to have a wage policy developed which
stayed as close to the most stringent level as he desired. The wage distortions, like the price distortions, made a catch-up regulation necessary.
With wage roll-backs even less possible than price roll-backs, Johnston
sought a wage catch-up which would reasonably cover the increased cost
of living that had already occurred as well as the rise which would occur
by the summer months of 1951 when the so-called wage-price plateau
could be held. The ten percent formula, it was calculated, would not only
satisfy the catch-up requirement, but would also cover the expected increases in consumer prices so that major contracts-General Motors in
particular-need not be disturbed.
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Wage Regulation 6 provided that the ten percent catch-up figure be
reviewed in light of the April 15, 1951, consumer price index, which
would be published the end of May, and it is fairly apparent that the
Wage Stabilization Board, with labor dissenting, looked upon this regulation as an all-inclusive wage policy regulation. Johnston, in the early
part of February, thought in these terms as well. Such a regulation,
assuming consumer prices were maintained at the June, 1951, levels,
could be considered compatible with the no pass-through, cost absorption
price policy.
It was at this policy level that Johnston attempted to coordinate the
price and wage programs. But this was not possible. Parity, and hence
agricultural prices, could not be shorn of their escalation and the labor
movement stood squarely behind the integrity of outstanding contracts
of wage leaders which contained escalation. In fact, labor indicated that
to be on an equitable basis with the farmer who had parity they were
entitled to not only wage escalation but also to an annual productivity
increase. They maintained that the farmer not only receives an adjustment in his price through parity but a further automatic increase in his
income through the fruits of expanded productivity. The productivity
increase to the worker, they noted, had to be bargained for since the
fruits of additional output did not accrue to them automatically.
Equitable as a non-escalation policy might theoretically have been
for all segments of society, it could not be made to stick. As Marion
Folsom expressed it, wage policy would have to allow for escalation "because so many people have gotten accustomed to the cost of living."'"
The tenor of public opinion and the asserted power of labor foredoomed
any policy which did not allow wage escalation. By February 27 Johnston
had recognized that Regulation 6, even with a possible revision after
April 15, could not, if the tripartite board was to be maintained, be
viewed as a viable total wage policy, and he recommended a step-by-step
approach to the development of such a wage policy.
In this setting, what conclusions can be made about the function of
price-wage coordination in establishing the level and stringency of controls and about the amount of "coordinating" that the Economic Stabilization Administrator was in a position to accomplish? It is clear that there
was a necessary and interdependent relationship between the level and
stringency of both price and wage control, as well as between the direct
controls and the application of other economic tools. Johnston attempted
to establish a workable balance, but the major factors affecting the level
and stringency of the price and wage controls were either given conditions
91.

Hearings before WSB, January 12, 1951.
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with which he had to work or were largely outside of his authority, responsibility, or power to control.
E. Staff Coordination
Throughout the period of direct price and wage controls the relationship between the OPS and the WSB were, for the most part, cordial but
distant. In December, 1950, when the whole Agency (ESA, OPS, and
WSB) consisted of only a handful of people, all located on one floor in
Temporary E Building, there was, by necessity and some desire, an attempt by OPS and WSB staffs to discuss with one another their mutual
problems. As the programs developed and as the agencies became physically separated, the staffs cooperated with one another only on specific
problems of mutual concern, and these were few.
There was recognition both on the part of OPS and WSB of the
general contrapuntal nature of the two programs, but most of the issues
facing each agency required no specific operational coordination. While
the development of the wage program required an understanding of the
general movement of consumer prices and the stringency of price control,
it did not require that the OPS staff help the WSB thrash out wage
regulation problems. In fact, the price agency believed strongly that,
while the two agencies should be cooperative, operationally they should
remain as distinctly separate agencies. There was recognition in OPS of
the danger that certain price-wage settlements would be suggested when
the WSB considered specific dispute cases. Therefore, OPS fought
against any policies or procedures which would require price action contingent on wage actions, or vice versa. The agency preferred to establish
fair and equitable price policies and "allow the chips to fall where they
may."9 2 The OPS was successful in maintaining their position of
separate operations. Over the approximately 27 months of active controls
not more than a dozen significant documents flowed between OPS
and WSB.
The Office of Price Stabilization staff, from the beginning, recognized the necessity of holding as tight a price line as possible, while at
the same time allowing a catch-up formula for wages. They appreciated
the need of Wage Regulations 6 and 8, and while the wage increases
92. 'Interview with Edward F. Phelps, Jr., April 1953. See also Arnall, Statement
on Steel, SEN. Doc. No. 118, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952), which was given before the
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and, in part, read, ".

.

. once the

stabilization framework has been set up, rules of equity should govern wage decisions,
and a similar set of principles should be used in judging the propriety of requested price
increases. To base either wage or price decisions upon the consequences in the other
field would be to abandon those rules of equity in relation both to labor and to business."
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brought pressure on the price ceilings OPS was establishing, the staff
felt that the policies were equitable and compatible. It was the lack of a
capstone to the wage policy which led OPS to claim that the WSB was
not being stringent enough and was requiring the price agency to carry
the major burden of control.
The Wage Stabilization Board starting off in a "catch-up mood"
took the attitude that prices could never be adequately controlled. It
believed it was being forced into establishing more liberal standards than
necessary when faced with labor arguments pointing to agriculture parity,
farm prices, Capehart pass-through, and so on. The Board felt it could
not be more stringent in its policies than other aspects of the stabilization
program.
As the program developed and the staffs, by necessity of work and
location, became farther removed, a lack of understanding of the details
and the actual stringency of the sister programs led to an attitude in both
agencies that each was making the major contribution despite the failures
of the other. The delegation of operating responsibility to the constituents undoubtedly contributed to the development of this mutual attitude.
The Economic Stabilization Administrators attempted to develop
closer mutual interagency understanding between ESA, OPS, WSB,
the Salary Stabilization Board, and the Office of Rent Stabilization
through the medium of staff conferences and various reports. There
was a natural resistance to these attempts as agencies' top staffs were
absorbed in their own problems and felt that there were precious few
specific questions which they would not rather solve themselves than
invite the help of their sister agencies or the "interference" of ESA.
This "live and let live" attitude between the price and wage agencies on
operational issues was similar to that which existed during World War II
between OPA and the NWLB.93 There were, however, a few substantive
issues which OPS and WSB had to work out collectively, two of the more
important ones being the wage productivity increase-price warranty issue
and the Alaskan fisheries question.
93. "The relations between the two major control agencies [during World War III
were not intimate in an operating sense. Nor does this appear to have been necessary.
The work of each agency conditioned the work of the other. At the same time, the
spheres of activity, and the special criteria, problems, and pressures were reasonably
distinct. If the Board performed its stabilization task effectively, powerful support was
provided for effective price stabilization. Effective price stabilization, in turn, served
to reduce the pressure for general wage rate revision. But it was not necessary for the
price control agency to become involved in the day-to-day administration of wage control, or for the wage control agency to be concerned with the routine conduct of the
price control function." Douty, The Development of Wage-Price Policies, 141 (BLS
Bulletin No. 1009, 1950).
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One of the first problems facing the newly appointed Wage Stabilization Board in May, 1951, was a consideration of the productivity or
annual improvement factor wage increase. A number of important wage
contracts contained clauses providing for a yearly increase in wage rates
as the employee's share of increased productivity of the plant. In the
General Motors contract, for instance, it amounted to an annual increase
of four cents an hour. Theoretically, real increase in productivity, by
definition, reduces the direct man-hours per unit of output and thereby
reduces the direct labor costs per unit of output. Therefore, the Wage
Stabilization Board reasoned, if there had been a growth in productivity
which the management recognized as grounds for a wage increase, this
wage increase should not add to the unit cost of production and hence
should not contribute an inflationary cost pressure against prices.9 The
WSB also maintained that the benefits to industrial relations, contributing to stable employment and production, which were derived from these
annual increases were Offsetting factors to any derived demand inflation
which such increases would cause.95
The Wage Board in June, 1951, therefore resolved that if annual
improvement factors existed in contracts executed before January 25,
1951, then they would be permitted to function providing the company
were willing to sign a warranty which established that the productivity
wage increase would not be used for requesting a price increase or resisting a price ceiling reduction.9 6
In the original discussions of this issue the WSB had suggested that
the granting of the annual improvement increases be contingent upon
OPS approval. The OPS, in accordance with its policy of separate
price-wage operations, vigorously opposed any such arrangement. In
fact, OPS challenged the very thesis which the Wage Board had put
forth. OPS reasoned that even though industrial productivity generally
increases at about 2.5 percent a year, there was no assurance that this
advance was being made in any particular plant or company. Measurement of this productivity increase was next to impossible, and certainly
OPS did not desire to try to ascertain it as a basis for approving particular wage increases. This, OPS felt, was a WSB function, although
they doubted that they could perform it. However, because OPS interim
regulations were on a self-determining basis and were not specific dollarand-cent ceiling regulations, and because the Industry Earnings Standard
94. See, e.g., letter, Taylor to Johnston, August 6, 1951, ESA files.
95. Ibid. These wage increases would, of course, contribute to purchasing power

and hence the increased demand for goods and services, but without knowing the alternative uses of these funds it is difficult to argue their relative inflationary impact.
96. WSB Resolution No. 94, June 6, 1951.
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could not easily be adapted to excluding wage rate increases granted on
grounds of increased productivity, OPS viewed the WSB resolution as
theoretically sound but administratively impossible and, in effect, a cost
increasing inflationary move.
The WSB productivity-price warranty resolution remained a leak
in the stabilization dike. By May, 1952, a total of 413 annual improvement price-warranty cases had been approved by WSB, with most of the
increases in industries in those segments of the economy where inflationary pressures were greatest. 7
Exemplary of a jurisdictional price-wage problem requiring the
Economic Stabilization Agency to make a decision for operational purposes was the Alaskan fishery question. The problem arose as to whether
the WSB or the OPS should have jurisdiction, under the Defense Production Act, over contracts concerning fresh Alaska salmon entered into
among fishermen or their unions. Due to various types of institutional
arrangements in the trade, the "raw fish" price could be considered either
a wage or a price. On the one hand there were fishermen who were employed by the canners to fish in canner-owned boats and who bargained
collectively between fisherman unions and canner trade associations to
establish the "fish price." However, there were also boat owners or
lessees who hired a crew and compensated the men on the basis of agreed
shares of the value of salmon caught and delivered to the canners. Here
the "fish price" was determined by bargaining among boat owners or
lessees, canners or their trade associations, and unions representing crew
members and in some cases, boat owners.
To settle the problem ESA established an interagency committee
composed of representatives of WSB, OPS, ESA, and Defense Fisheries
Administration, which recommended unanimously that WSB should have
jurisdiction over the "fish price" while OPS should have jurisdiction
over the price of canned Alaska salmon. DiSalle and Feinsinger made
this recommendation jointly to Putnam, who approved it on January
23, 1952."
New Price-Wage Line, Summer and Fall 1951
In the spring of 1951 Eric Johnston had attempted to establish a
price-wage line at the summer "plateau" levels requisite to an effective
and sound stabilization program. Essential to this goal, he felt, was the
97. Memoranda, Feinsinger to Putnam, Annual Improvement Factor Cases, May 29,
June 9, June 17, and June 23, 1952, ESA files. See also letter, Arnall to Putnam, June 9,
1952, ESA files.
98. ESA General Order No. 14, Jurisdiction over Payments and Obligations Concerning Fresh Alaska Salmon, January 25, 1952, 17 FED. REG. 782 (1952).
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carrying through of the interim price regulations with their roll-back provision, the maintenance of pre-Korea cost-price margins, the freezing
of agricultural parity at January levels, the curtailing of business profits,
a wage freeze as of July 1, 1951, and, finally, tighter indirect controls in
taxes and credit. None of these conditions was effected and the pricewage plateau was necessarily raised to a higher level. Furthermore, the
new plateau seemed less clear and distinct.
Congress weakened the provisions of Title IV of the Defense Production Act, rather than extending and strengthening them and thereby
ended the possibility of putting into effect the price condition necessary
to the maintenance of the stabilization plateau. In extending the Act
Congress not only forbade the price roll-backs of the interim price regulations, which were just going into effect, but also passed the Capehart
Amendment which raised the price stabilization level by requiring price
ceilings, upon application of individual manufacturers, to reflect changes
in practically all costs up to July 26, 1951. The interim regulations had
allowed reflection only of material and direct labor costs and had December 31, 1950, and March 15, 1951, as cutoff dates. The amendment,
which applied to each individual seller upon his own application, raised
additional and most serious administrative problems.
Another 1951 amendment, called the Herlong Amendment, created
a possibility of a still higher price level by forbidding the reduction of
distributor's margins below their customary percentage margins in effect
just prior to Korea. Thus, while distributor's operating costs do not
rise in the same proportion as the cost of their merchandise, this amendment permitted the increase in all wholesale prices to be passed on to the
consumer and raised further in the process.
A further hole was punctured into the effective price control authority by the Butler-Hope Amendment which forbade the use of slaughtering
quotas for livestock. Since no effective technique has ever been devised
for controlling the price of beef on the hoof, slaughter quotas were considered a necessary part of effective beef price control to channel the
beef to legitimate packers where effective control over the slaughtered
beef could be established.
These three price control amendments seriously weakened one of
the conditions for achieving the price-wage line which Johnston had
sought. Further, the agricultural parity freeze condition met vigorous
opposition from the Department of Agriculture, never received Administration support, and died within the executive branch without ever
being recommended to the Congress.
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Despite these setbacks OPS continued to make some strides in
tightening controls by developing tailored dollar-and-cents regulations
for various commodities in such industries as metals, rubber products,
and crude oil, but OPS was also faced with directives from ODM to
raise prices in order to increase some vital supplies. In the machine
tool industry OPS was ordered to raise prices above their standards in
order to stimulate defense production and also was directed to exempt
from price control certain imported and domestic strategic materials
where it was believed that domestic price control tended to restrict
U. S. supply.
On the wage stabilization front it was obviously quite impossible
by the summer of 1951 to expect that the July 1 wage freeze condition
could be put into effect. With a restriction on price roll-back, an increase
in distributor margins and less of a chance to enforce meat, and hence
food prices, it was inconceivable on equity grounds to expect as stringent
a wage policy as a freeze. Johnston again sought, however, to get some
capstone to the segmented wage policy from the Wage Board. The
Board was not of a mind to be pushed to the development of a total wage
policy. In fact, it rather desired to lean on Johnston where convenient,
following him only in matters agreeable to it.
On June 30 the Act was extended for a month prior to final Congressional consideration, but some wage regulations without positive
action would have expired on June 30. One of these regulations was
Wage Regulation 8, which Johnston had issued during the Board's
temporary non-existence in the spring. Having been criticized by the
WSB for issuing this regulation, Johnston was adamant in maintaining
that he was not going to extend Regulation 8 without a positive recommendation from the Board to this effect. The tripartite board was not
in agreement as to the shape which Regulation 8 should take and not
wishing to commit itself prematurely, which it felt might be implied by
the recommendation for extension, the Board wanted Johnston to keep
the regulation alive by extending its application for the month. Most
unenthusiastically Johnston did extend Regulation 8 "to maintain the
status quo . . .so that the Board can expedite its overall review."

How-

ever, Johnston sought as a quid pro quo for his obliging act, a total wage
policy. He wrote: "I request the Board to develop the wage formula
recommendation as far in advance of July 31 as possible. I feel there is
no more urgent and important matter before the Board than the development of such a formula to bring about stability in the wage structure
during this critical national emergency.""
99.

Letter, Johnston to Taylor, June 30, 1951, ESA files.
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The Board did not agree that the development of such a formula was
essential, and continued its piecemeal approach. On August 2 the Board
unanimously established for all workers cost-of-living wage adjustments
through automatic escalator clauses, periodic reopenings of contracts or
voluntary adjustments where collective bargaining was not involved.
Thus, in addition to the ten percent catch-up, straight-time rates of pay
were permitted to move up from January 15, 1951, but by no more than
the increase in consumers' prices. By August 15 this increase amounted
to two percent. The declared policy also recognized that in certain instances inequities would arise where the last wage change had been made
prior to January 15, 1951, and therefore they allowed some variance,
on application, for different base dates for calculation."' 0
The Board was also developing regulations to correct intraplant inequities, wage increases to be permitted on the basis of merit, length of
service, and other intraplant adjustments. Johnston was concerned with
the way in which the Board was getting away from the catch-up concept.
He feared it would develop a wage policy for fringes and inequities of
one sort or another on a case-by-case basis which would provide no
specific overall limit that could be established and maintained in the face
of new cases coming before the Board. The forthcoming steel negotiations were in everyone's mind. Johnston believed that a firm wage ceiling at a level somewhat above cost-of-living increases could be held, but
Chairman Taylor, while willing to discuss the issue in an atmosphere of
a "competition of ideas," would not be budged. He believed that an unspecified ceiling would be less inflationary since it would not establish a
goal toward which all collective bargaining would tend to drift. Furthermore, a specific ceiling would not have given the WSB the latitude it
needed to arbitrate the case in the event it would be certified to them
by the President. No capstone to the wage policy was formulated by
the WSB.
This August, 1951, effort was the last which Johnston made to
achieve a total and limited wage policy similar to that of the Little Steel
formula of World War II. The Board believed that there was no real
chance of maintaining such a policy. It felt that there was a vast difference in the psychological basis inherent in a limited mobilization
without a no-strike pledge, and that some degree of latitude was needed
in the current environment to avoid undue interference with production,
morale, equity, and collective bargaining. The question with which the
Board struggled was how to provide, in the period of limited mobilization,
a gradual improvement of real wages while at the same time confining the
100. For example, the cotton textile wage cases in Fall River and New Bedford.
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rate of improvement to limits consistent with stabilization. The Board
feared limiting its policy, believing that such a limitation would have to
"cover" the wage leaders and hence the policy would in effect be more
inflationary than need be.
Johnston believed that it was reasonable that the wage level should
be kept within bounds which would compensate for general price level
changes, plus a fair share of the rise of total output. Increases beyond
that limitation would generate an abnormal inflationary pressure and
would make price control unnecessarily difficult. Johnston recognized
the danger which an all-embracing formula reflecting this policy would
have in becoming a goal rather than a ceiling. However, at the same
time, he had greater fears that the complexity of individual wage regulations, while in themselves perhaps fair and equitable, together might
exceed the limits of wage stabilization."'
If any doubts remained, the Board made its position clear in September, 1951, by issuing a statement on the relation of the Wage Stabilization Board to collective bargaining. It unanimously declared that:
".. . if the Board is to preserve the values of collective bargaining to the
fullest practicable extent, it must stay out of the collective bargaining
room and must not jeopardize any proposal or counterproposal during
the bargaining process. The Board, therefore, cannot and will not undertake to prescribe the permissible 'limitations' beforehand under which the
parties can or must bargain."' 2 The Board's statement went on to note
that it had confidence that employers and unions "will accept responsibility to conduct their negotiations consistent with wage stabilization
policy," but reminded them that "the important question under wage
stabilization is not what the parties may agree upon but what the Board
will approve."
With this type of guidance the wage negotiations in the steel industry commenced. Meanwhile the OPS was attempting to tighten its
regulations to the limit allowed by the law. DiSalle told his staff that,
"[o]ur objective must be to keep from increasing prices and to reduce
them wherever possible. Any increase should be the exception rather
than the rule, and I will not sign any regulations increasing prices past
101. Compare memorandum, Johnston to Wilson, Present Position of Wage Stabilization Policy, October 29, 1951, ESA files. See also ESA Report, Johnston, Strong
Dollars 30-31 (November 30, 1951).
102. Unanimous statement of the WSB, The Wage Stabilization Board and Collectilve Bargaining, September 21, 1951, Press Release WSB-112 (emphasis added).
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GCPR levels unless accompanied by the fullest kind of economic
justifications."' 10 3
Support for "as stringent controls as possible" came from the Defense Mobilization Board where ODM Director Wilson noted that the
challenges to our security and our economy required that every step be
taken to avoid breaching of price and wage standards. The consensus
of the Board meeting was "that every possible step should be taken by
the mobilization agencies to hold the line against inflation." While the
production agencies, agreed with this statement, they indicated that such
It was well
action should not be permitted to lead to a steel strike.'
recognized in ESA that the forthcoming steel dispute and price issue
would be the first severe test of the Industry Earnings Standard. Some
modifications to the standard were discussed informally with OPS on
grounds that if no really firm agreement within government could be
obtained to adhere to the Earnings Standard,0 5 then perhaps it would be
better to moderate its impact beforehand rather than have it a "victim of
expediency" in its first test. But no support was obtained within government at this time for a modification of the Earnings Standard despite
the fact that others outside of government were recommending a price
The Committee for Economic
policy requiring no cost absorption.'
Development in December, 1951, issued one of its national policy statements on price and wage controls calling for a flexible adjustment system
of price and wage control and allowing for an automatic escalation on
costs for all sectors of the economy.'
Coordination in Crisis-Steel
As Roger L. Putnam assumed the office of Economic Stabilization
Administrator in December, 1951, there was a lull before the storm as the
battle lines of the steel controversy took shape. It had been impossible to
get a wage formula from the tripartite wage board with a specific overall
limitation, and for the Administrator to have promulgated one would
have caused the Wage Board to resign. Furthermore, the WSB would
103. See OPS Joint Statement on Price Policy to Accompany Price Operations
Memorandum No. 13, Hearings before the Joint Committee on Defense Prodction on

the Defense Production Act: Progress Report No. io, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 648-649
(1951).
104. Minutes, Meeting No. 20, DMB, November 28, 1951.
105. Memorandum, Johnson to Ackley and Phelps, Possible Modification of Earnings Standard,December 6, 1951, ESA files.

106. None of the modifying suggestions would have allowed steel to pass-through
the wage increase which was eventually granted or any significant part of it.
107. Compare Committee for Economic Development, Price and Wage Controls,
A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee, December 2, 1951.
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not prejudge any collective bargaining by making a statement regarding
the upper limit of settlement.
Price-wise the facts were clear. Only a small price increase was
due the industry under a Capehart application," 8 and the industry had
tremendous absorptive capacity for cost increases under the Industry
Earnings Standard. Steel industry earnings before taxes had increased
from a base of $1.2 billion in the 1947-1949 base period (adjusted to
$1.3 billion to take account of increased net worth) to $2.5 billion in
1951. Therefore the industry could absorb cost increases of about $1.2
billion before it could qualify for a price increase, other than Capehart,
under OPS standards. 9 It was roughly estimated in ESA in December,
1951, that for each one cent an hour wage increase the steel industry's
total labor costs would increase by about $22.6 million a year." 0 It
appeared that even a twenty cent an hour wage increase, presumed at the
time to be the outer limit to what might be expected, would cost less than
one-half billion dollars with the industry having over one billion dollars of
absorptive capacity under the Industry Earnings Standard."'
The "ground rules" of price and wage controls were established in
this manner and the economic facts of the industry were easily available
to all parties concerned in the controversy which was brewing. The steelworkers' union had made clear their contempt for the current WSB
policy standards and the steel companies had been equally forthright in
their position against any cost absorption, insisting upon a complete passthrough of any wage increase that might be granted.
Faced with these facts and these positions, what was the price-wage
coordinating function of the Economic Stabilization Administrator as he
took office in December, 1951 ? His price policy he believed to be sound
and equitable. His wage policy he believed to be the best that he could
obtain and still maintain a tripartite wage board. In spite of pressure
from OPS for Putnam, Feinsinger, and DiSalle to state jointly, clearly,
and categorically the limits of price and wage standards so that the steel
companies, the union, and-more important-the public would know
108. See memorandum, Kaufmann, Estimated Effect of Cost Increases Under a
Capehart Calculation for the Steel Industry, December, 1951, ESA and OPS files.
109. OPS, The People's Stake 6, April, 1952. See also Arnall, Statement on Steel,
SENT. Doc. No. 118, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
110. Memorandum, Bold, Effect of a Wage Increase on the Eanzin~gs Position of
the Primary Iron and Steel Industry, Office of Economic Policy, ESA, December, 1951,
ESA files.
111. Also, of course, the net cost after taxes to the industry, due to the higher excess profits tax take, meant that in fact a wage increase would in part be paid by the
taxpayer through loss of revenue, and it would have a relatively small net effect on the
earnings position of the industry.
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the limits within which the bargaining was taking place,' Putnam, following the WSB position, decided to remain silent on wage standards
and not prejudice the bargaining one way or another. On December 14,
1951, Putnam did state clearly to the steel industry that, outside of the
price increase due from the Capehart Amendment, there would be no steel
price increase to pass through the wage cost increase granted in the
pending negotiation." 3 While this statement was not a collective ESAOPS-WSB declaration, it went part way to present the OPS approach.
On December 17, 1951, the United Steel Workers of America announced that they were unable to reach an agreement with the industry
and called a strike for January 1, 1952. The Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service on December 21, 1951, certified the dispute to the
President, who referred it to WSB in their disputes capacity. Through
a series of requests and postponements the strike was deferred until
April 8. On March 20, 1952, WSB with the industry members dissenting, made their recommendations on settlement to the President.
In formulating their dispute settlement recommendations the public
members of the Wage Stabilization Board were in the difficult position
of attempting to accomplish three ends simultaneously: (1) settlement of
the dispute, (2) yet within the limits of the Wage Stabilization Board
and stabilization policy, and (3) with the recommendations coming from
a majority of the Wage Stabilization Board. Feinsinger believed that a
separate public members' recommendation would destroy the tripartite
board" and, hence, insisted on a majority recommendation either jointly
with labor or with industry representatives, if it was impossible to achieve
a unanimous decision.
A unanimous decision was impossible. The labor and industry
representatives of the Board generally reflected the magnitude of the
differences between the USWA and the steel companies. While there
were some twenty-two different items in the contract at issue, the breadth
of the gap between the parties in March can be seen in the demand of
about thirty-two cents an hour from the union and an offer of approximately nine cents an hour from the industry." 5 Unable to get the industry offer to a significantly higher level but able to get the labor demand
to a lower figure, the public members, insisting on a majority recom112. Draft memorandum, DiSalle to Johnston, Steel Wages and Price, prepared by
Gardner Ackley, November 13, 1951; revised and transmitted to Putnam December 1,
1951, ESA files.
113. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1951, p. 1, col. 5.
114. This belief was not shared by others who had experience both on and with
tripartite government wage boards.
115. Because, however, some of them were non-economic issues, it is somewhat
misleading to express them on a cent-per-hour basis.
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mendation rather than three separate recommendations, joined the labor
members in making their recommendation to the President. The recommendation, they believed, could form the basis of settlement of the dispute, and, while not asking or obtaining the approval of the Economic
Stabilization Administrator before making the recommendation public,
they steadfastly assured the President that the decision was within WSB
policy standards and not injurious to the stabilization effort.
The recommendations were cited in the press as amounting to about
twenty-six cents an hour. Because of the staggered time interval at
which the increases were to go into effect and the fact that this was a
contract covering eighteen months rather than a year, this cumulative
total of about twenty-six cents was misleading to the point of being
incorrect." 6 The USWA accepted the recommendations of the WSB
but noted that they were far from completely satisfactory to the union
members. The steel companies, previously having agreed to give the
recommendations serious consideration, found them unacceptable. ODM
Director Wilson, upon his return from Key West on March 24, said that
the WSB recommendations "would be a serious threat to our year-old
effort to stabilize the economy." Putnam, while at first showing surprise at the size of the recommendations, defended them as within wage
stabilization policy limits.
Chairman Feinsinger, at the request of John Steelman, who had
become Acting Defense Mobilizer on March 30 following Wilson's
resignation, attempted to get the union and the companies to negotiate in
New York on the basis of the WSB recommendations. The steel companies were still adamantly maintaining that they would not agree to any
settlement which did not allow a full pass-through of increased labor
costs, and were encouraged by offers of a price increase, reportedly
around $4 to $5 a ton, being made from the White House. Past experience of 1950 as well as 1946 also might well have given the steel
companies reason to believe they could get a price increase negotiated.
The steel industry claimed that a $12 per ton increase was required to
cover the increased wage bill of the WSB recommendation. The OPS
116. The recommendation was for a general wage increase of 12.5 cents an hour
effective January 1, 1952, plus further increases of 2.5 cents an hour on July 1, 1952,
and January 1, 1953. Also recommended were "fringe" adjustments, including the introduction of six paid holidays, a reduction of the qualifying period for three weeks' vacation from twenty-five to fifteen years, an increase in night shift differentials, and time
and a quarter for Sunday, the last recommendation not to be effective until January 1,
1953. The Board recommended that the parties include a union shop in their new contract, the specific type to be determined in the forthcoming negotiations. Rejected by
the Board, inter alia, were the guaranteed annual wage (it was suggested that the parties
jointly consider the problem), changes regarding wage inequities, working conditions,
and management rights.
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and Putnam maintained that the increased costs of the full WSB recommendation could be estimated at $4.67 a ton, that the industry had an
absorptive capacity under the Earnings Standard of about $9 a ton, and
hence that it should have no price increase other than almost $3 a ton
to which it was entitled under the Capehart Amendment.
On the same day that Feinsinger notified Steelman that settlement
was not in sight, though some progress had been made, the President
announced that he would order the Secretary of Commerce to seize the
steel companies in order that continued production might be assured.
Simultaneously, Congress was notified, and appropriate legislation was
invited if considered necessary. The industry's request for an injunction
against the seizure was denied on April 9. While this state of affairs
existed and while negotiations proceeded irregularly, Putnam directed
Arnall to allow the steel companies, upon their application, the $3 per
ton increase to which they were entitled under the Capehart Amendment.
After the Supreme Court held the seizure unconstitutional on June 2,
the strike originally called for the first of the year began. The negotiations resumed but met an impasse, and President Truman recommended
to Congress that it either grant seizure powers or authorize and direct
use of the Taft-Hartley Act. The' Congress responded by amending the
Defense Production Act, but it declined to enable the presidential seizure
and requested the President to utilize the Taft-Hartley Act. While
certain of the small companies signed new contracts in June, a settlement
with the major producers was not reached until July 25.
Despite the fact that the Earnings Standard was thereby pierced,
Acting Mobilization Director Steelman directed OPS to grant a ceiling
price increase on carbon steel of $5.20 a ton,11 and, as a quid pro quo to
this price increase, a wage settlement was negotiated quite similar to the
March 20 WSB recommendations."' 8
117. The industry was entitled to $2.84 of this increase under the Capehart Amendment provisions, and another $1.66 was allowed to cover part of the labor cost increase,
and an additional 70 cents was permitted for the freight increases authorized in May
by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
118. A general wage increase of 12.5 cents, plus an increase of 3.5 cents to maintain appropriate internal job rate relationships effective March 1, 1952, was agreed upon.
This differed only slightly from the March 20 recommendation of 12.5 cents January 1,
1952, plus 2.5 cents July 1, 1952, and January 1, 1953. The settlement also provided for
5.5 cents of fringe benefits, as compared to the 8.5 cents in the WSB recommendation,
and the shift and geographic differentials, holiday pay, and vacation provisions were
identical although the time and a quarter for Sunday work was dropped. The new agreement, however, covered almost a two-year period, rather than eighteen months. Furthermore, the parties agreed to a type of union membership requirements with withdrawal
provision instead of a full union shop, which was suggested by the WSB.
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Effects of Steel Crisis and Settlement
There were many effects of the steel crisis, strike, and settlement.
Tons of steel production were irrevocably lost; the Congress extended
the life of the Board but limited its disputes function to economic issues;
a series of tandem wage increases spread to other metal-working industries, and a serious rent was torn in the price control structure.
One of the immediate reactions to the crisis was a cry from Congress
and elsewhere that the coordinating function of ESA was not being
properly carried out. Congress, in fact, amended the Defense Production
Act to provide that "[i]t shall be the express duty, obligation, and function of the present Economic Stabilization Agency, or any successor
agency to coordinate the relationship between prices and wages, and to
'
The members of the Senate Banking and
stabilize prices and wages."119
Curreny Committee declared they were, ".

.

. not satisfied that there

is sufficient guaranty in the present act that all general wage stabilization
policies are subject to the approval of the Administrator, who must be
in a position to coordinate stabilization policies."' 20
Within the executive branch, it was ordered that some obscure
solution lurking beneath the words "coordination of price and wage
policy" be found. At a May meeting of the Mobilization Executive
Staff, ESA was ordered to'develop a staff paper on "methods of coordinating the formulation of wage and price policy." Specifically noted
was that which Johnston had vainly sought, namely, ".

.

. a method of

formulating wage policy which would result in the approval of the policy
by the Administrator of ESA and the Director of ODM and within
which the Wage Stabilization Board would then handle dispute cases."''
On Capitol Hill, the House Committee on Education and Labor
noted that it seemed, ".

.

. clear to the committee that all wage policies

and regulations should be carefully considered in relation to their effect
on prices and coordinated with price regulations prior to their approval.
In the present stabilization program that study and coordination seems
clearly to be the function and responsibility of the Economic Stabilization
Administrator. Obviously that correlation and coordination has not been
carried out. Undoubtedly the handling of disputes by the Board has
been a major reason for the failure although there have, of course,
been others."''
119. 66 STAT. 301, 50 U.S.C. §2103(d) (1952).
120. SEN. REP. No. 1599 at 27-28, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
121. Minutes, Meeting No. 31, Mobilization Executive Staff, May 7, 1952.
122. H.R. RP. No. 2190 at 24-25, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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It was not so obvious that the "correlation and coordination had not
been carried out." Putnam had made sure that the Wage Stabilization
Board was fully aware of the price consequences of wage decisions of
various magnitudes before it made its recommendations to the President.
The Chairman of the WSB on the night the WSB decision was made
final was informed by Putnam that Wilson and the White House held
that if a choice between avoiding a steel strike or stabilization was
necessary, to stand by stabilization. The Economic Stabilization Administrator was not required or allowed to approve the WSB disputes
recommendation. Such approval was considered incompatible with the
disputes function. As a coordinator of the price and wage policies, what
more was expected or could have been demanded of the Economic Stabilization Administrator? Putnam stated his position in these words:
". ..I could not order what this Board should recommend, and I do
not think anybody should. I think a tripartite board's the best way to
settle labor disputes. I could not order them, but on the other hand,
coordination and an understanding of what
I think there was complete
12 3
the effects would be.' 1
Immediately after the March 20 WSB steel recommendations, Putnam did, however, have some belated suggestions which he felt would
help avoid Congressional emasculation of the WSB, and better align the
Board as a member of the "stabilization team." He believed that OPS
should present more formally to the WSB the price effects of any wage
decision. When no common tripartite WSB recommendation could be
achieved, he felt that the public members should be free to make a recommendation of their own and that it should be considered that of the
Board. 24
There were other suggestions being discussed among ESA staff at
the time which were aimed at forestalling future crises like steel. They
included an amendment to Executive Order 10233 requiring the Economic Stabilization Administrator to participate in major dispute case
decisions regarding the limit beyond which requested increases might be
considered as unstabilizing. Also it was suggested that the Administrator
establish necessary conditions for productivity wage increases requiring
a quid pro quo of labor-management cooperation and restricting use of
productivity increases for wage leaders as a supplementary basis for an
increase on top of other regulations. Finally it was believed that the
123. Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S.2594 and
S.z645, Defense Production Act Amendments of x952, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1964 (1952).

124. Draft letter, Putnam to Feinsinger, April 1, 1952. The letter was never sent,
but its ideas were discussed with Feinsinger.
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Administrator might seek and obtain an active role in the selection of
members of the Wage Stabilization Board.'25
While these suggestions given to Putnam, as well as those discussed
with Feinsinger, might have been an answer to some of the arguments
being raised at the time, they would not have gone to the heart of the
difficulty. The real problem lay in the incongruity in and among (1) a
tripartite board from which a specifically defined, limited wage policy
could not be obtained, (2) assured compatibility of price and wage policy
through an effective direct controls program, and (3) a tripartite board
with disputes settling authority and wage stabilization responsibility.
While Putnam's suggestions might have aided in getting somewhat closer
compatibility of price and wage policy, it still would have fallen short of
resolving the incongruity of a tripartite board with dispute functions
necessarily holding itself within stabilization goals.
If, in our democracy, tripartitism is necessary for developing wage
policy and settling disputes with or without a no-strike no-lockout pledge,
then it appears that the cost to our society of such a system is the possibility and, in a limited mobilization, the probability of inconsistency of
objectives and a resolution of the inconsistency through strikes and industry power plays challenging government authority.
Certain conditions existing in December, 1951, made a serious crisis
and probably a strike inevitable in the steel industry. On the one hand
a limited emergency creating the sense of limited urgency without a nostrike no-lockout pledge was coupled with the steel industry's refusal to
abide by the government pricing standards and the union's challenge of
the "limits" to wage policy. On the other hand the tripartite board had
both dispute and stabilization responsibility, and this tripartite wage
board refused to present a public members' position. Over these conditions the Economic Stabilization Administrator had little authority or
control; it is most difficult to understand how one could have looked to
the words-"coordination and integration of price and wage policy"-and
expected an easy and peaceful resolution to the conflict.
In retrospect one can recognize the desirability of an independent
recommendation in such disputes when a labor-management settlement,
clearly within stabilization limits, is not possible. At the time of the steel
dispute, however, the Economic Stabilization Administrator could not
have insisted upon this, since he had no authority in the disputes function.
It is clearly desirable for the government to insist on a public member
125. Memorandum, Malin to Caplan, Economic Stabilizer's Influence on Wage Stabilization, April 3, 1952, ESA files, together with draft letter prepared for Putnam in
Economic Policy Office, April 3, 1952.
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recommendation in disputes when the only settlement possible with a
majority of the wage board transgresses stabilization limitations.
In private labor-management disputes the mediator has the prime
objective of seeking a common ground upon which both management and
labor can agree. Similarly in arbitration the arbitrator seeks this common ground with the prior commitment of both parties that they will
abide by the decision rendered. In both instances reaching a workable
solution of the conflict is the third party's objective.
Persons trained as conciliators with experience in arbitration and
mediation, appointed as public members of a government tripartite wage
board, must bring with them their acquired skills. But they must, at all
times, recognize that in their public member capacities they are not merely
arbitrating or mediating a private dispute between labor and management. The common ground for dispute settlement which they seek must
not only be within the stabilization limitations, but it must simultaneously
be building part of the foundation for the whole stabilization program.
If public members act merely as mediators or arbitrators and do not recognize their stabilization responsibilities as public members of the government wage board, they are not fulfilling their public trust. At times,
therefore, it may be necessary for them to recognize that, having failed
to develop a common ground for settlement within stabilization limits
among a majority of the board, they must, in performance of their public
trust, submit an independent public member recommendation. This requirement puts a high premium on the statesmanship and personal qualities of the wage board chairman. It also puts great responsibilities and
risks on all the public members, since not only is their public reputation at
stake, but their future careers in conciliation work are put in jeopardy.
Price-Wage Problem Following Steel
Immediately following the settlement OPS was faced with the difficult problem of where and how to hold the price line since the steel settlement had pierced the Industry Earnings Standard. While prices in the
soft goods sector of the economy had been receding over the year, prices
and cost pressures in the hard goods, metal-working sector were pushing
ceilings. Furtherm6re, the steel settlement and its effects on tandem
wage increases in metal-working industries were not the only problem.
Wage demands in the aluminum industry in the summer of 1952,
similar to the steel settlement, led the three major aluminum producers
to make a bid for an increase in the price of pig aluminum 2 to 2.35 cents
a pound over the eighteen cent ceiling and for a 10 to 12.5 percent increase
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in the price of primary aluminum to cover the increased labor and other
costs. To insure the maintenance and expansion of defense production,
OPS, on the basis of maintaining pre-Korea margins, granted a price
increase under the Essential Products Regulation of about one-half of
the industry's request.
Also in the early summer of 1952 OPS was faced with a higher
price for imported copper. In May the Chilean government rescinded
the previous agreement with the United States which had provided for
the receipt by the United States of ninety percent of the output from
American-owned Chilean mines at a price of 27.5 cents. Although this
price was three cents above the domestic ceiling of 24.5 cents, the twoprice system, while difficult to maintain, was not impossible. With the
termination of the agreement with Chile the imported price threatened
to go as high as 36.5 cents. ESA had attempted to establish an import
subsidy plan to protect the domestic ceilings, but was overruled by ODM
when the DPA and the State Department objected to an import subsidy.
OPS was forced to permit some pass-through of the increased foreign
price, and OPS issued a regulation allowing the buyers to pass on eighty
percent of any excess over the domestic ceiling price of 24.5 cents, but
required the using industries to absorb the other twenty percent.
The price increases for these three basic materials-steel, aluminum,
and copper-naturally caused increases in costs to manufacturers at the
next stage of fabrication of the metals. Fabricators at this second stage
were simultaneously being faced with increased labor costs and a higher
rail freight cost resulting from a May ICC rate increase. Relief was
available to the metal-working industry under the Industry Earnings
Standard, but if the Standard were to be applied strictly to these industries, they would have been forced to bear the brunt of all of the unusual
price increases granted in steel, copper, and aluminum. This appeared to
be most inequitable; yet it was nevertheless most important from the
stabilization standpoint to prevent these metal increases from developing
a "pass-through" pattern to be followed for all other cost increases.
In developing an equitable "pass-through" policy ESA worked
closely with OPS. It was recognized that a procedure need be so devised
that adjustments for major cost increases would be allowed but not for
every minor cost change, that the amount of absorption should be sufficient to evoke real resistance on the part of industry to the acceptance
of increased cost, that the permitted pass-through should be sufficient to
eliminate most of the costs which would otherwise be anticipated during
the coming year from the Industry Earnings Standard, and, finally, that
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the standard should be relatively simple to apply, easily understood, and
logically defensible.
These criteria were not mutually compatible, and it was found, as so
often is the case, that the simplest standard was least equitable, and that
the most equitable would be an administrative nightmare. The alternatives under discussion ranged from a delayed 100 percent pass-through of
metal cost increases to straight partial pass-through or a partial passthrough after initial absorption based on a recent profit rate or change
from a base period rate, or, possibly, a combination of these alternatives.
The Office of Price Stabilization with ESA concurrence, decided on
allowing purchasers of primary steel, aluminum, and copper products to
add to their current ceiling prices the amounts by which mills producing
the basic metals were allowed to increase their prices. 2 ' In this manner
the basic metal price advances were allowed to be passed through at
secondary and subsequent stages of fabrication without absorption but
also without pyramiding, and other costs, including labor costs, had to be
absorbed under the Industry Earnings Standard. Concurrently OPS
simplified the procedure for reviewing Industry Earnings Standard relief applications.
While there were other serious repercussions from the steel settlement,'27 including loss of public respect for the direct controls program,
the major one from the point of view of price-wage coordination was the
loosening of the price standards and the raising of the level of the
stabilization line.
Program Coordination in World War II
During World War II the Office of Economic Stabilization was
established by Executive Order 9250 in 1942 after the price and wage
programs were well launched. Its function in relation to OPA and
NWLB closely resembled the relationship between ESA and the price and
wage agencies, with the major exception that OES did not have the operational ties with the agencies; OES was far more of a judge of their conflicts than an operational manager. However, in Executive Order 9250
establishing OES, it was provided that:

".

.

. where the National War

Labor Board of the Price Administrator shall have reason to believe that
a proposed wage increase will require a change in the price ceiling of the
126. GOR No. 35, September 10, 1952, 17 FED. REG. 8179 (1952).
127. It can be maintained that the coal problem in the fall of 1952 was an indirect
outgrowth of the steel settlement, insofar as standards had been loosened and the new
WSB, in their coal decision, was reacting to the steel settlement heritage by "proving"
that WSB standards were firm. With most coal prices being well below ceiling levels
the coal problem was essentially a wage problem with little price repercussion.
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commodity or service involved, such proposed increase, if approved by
the National War Labor Board, shall become effective only if also approved by the Director [of Economic Stabilization]."
This Executive Order provision necessitated NWLB-OPA cooperation, and in both voluntary and dispute cases employers were required
to indicate whether the wage adjustment, if approved, would result in a
price relief application. If an affirmative answer were given, the employer filed a price relief application with OPA. If OPA denied the
application, the Board would be notified and could act; however, if OPA
found a price increase would be warranted, the wage increase could not
be made effective until the Director of Economic Stabilization gave his
approval.
While only about one-half of one percent of Board cases were reviewed by OES, "[v]irtually no wage adjustments . . . were denied on

price grounds, and the volume of price or production cost cases was small
in relation to the total number of cases."12 Yet it has been maintained
that ".

.

. the review function, by providing the Director of Economic

Stabilization with veto power over wage actions immediately affecting
price, enabled him to exercise a more direct influence on policy application
been the case. This influence is difficult to
than might otherwise have
1 29
appraise, but it was real."

Despite this review function the general position between OES and
the wage and price agencies regarding price-wage coordination was
roughly akin to ESA's position. The operational relations between the
major control agencies were not closely knit, and OES exerted its influence of coordination more by visualizing a stabilization line which it believed had to be held and then attempting to work with each agency
through either policy proclamation or attempt to gain public or government support for the maintenance of the individual programs at the level
and stringency desired. However, from the "hold-the-line" order on
April 8, 1943, which designated the assumption by OES of a positive role
in policy direction and determination, the OES encountered difficulties in
its relation with the tripartite NWLB which had dispute functions. The
"hold-the-line" order was a great aid in providing the OPA with greater
stature and support to resist price pressure but the Chairman of the
NWLB reported that "under the new [hold-the-line] order, wage disputes could no longer be arbitrated."12
128.
129.
130.

Douty, supra note 93, at 140.
Ibid.
TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 171-196 (1948).
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Even with the sense of urgency which existed in World War II and
the greater public support for a stabilization program, there existed the
basic incongruity of a tripartite wage board attempting to maintain a
wage stabilization program and still keep the latitude of policy required
for effective arbitration of disputes. Because of closer contact with the
President, the OES Director was able to gather greater support for the
stabilization program than could the ESA Administrator who had to
seek support through the "production minded" Office of Defense Mobilization. 3 ' Basically, however, in both World War II and the Korea
emergency periods the specific coordinating function between the price
and wage agencies was limited. As much public, Congressional, and executive government support had to be found for each program, but the
salient forces affecting each program were largely outside the authority
of the stabilization director. The stabilization director in an emergency,
acting within the basic rules to which our democratic society strictly
adheres, finds himself responsible for far more than he has the authority
to deliver, but he can nonetheless contribute to the stabilization effort
within his limited scope of power.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

The major conclusion which emerges from this analysis is that an
Economic Stabilization Administrator assigned the task of coordinating
the direct price and wage control programs has been in the past, and in
many respects will, in our society, always be, limited in his authority
and ability of assuring the economic stabilization and price-wage coordination which his title implies. Nonetheless, it is also apparent that
while the task of coordinating the price-wage program is one which can
never, in our democratic society, be accomplished in a definitive manner
by any administrator, the task is an important one which, in an emergency, must be assigned to an individual of great courage and skill who
recognizes both the limitations and importance of his assignment.
These conclusions are predicated on the recognition that many of the
determining factors affecting both the level and stringency of price and
When reviewing a draft of this document, Mr. DiSalle observed:
• * . the wage program and its coordination with price would only be successful if the full power of the office of the President is directly connected
with the program. Economic stabilization two or three layers removed from
the White House cannot be effective, and since the major problems eventually
wind up there anyway, why hide the agency in an ODM or make it subservient
to any other agency. I think it is possible to coordinate stabilization with production, but I don't think it would be necessary to make stabilization subservient
to production. The Economic Stabilizer should be appointed by the President
and be responsible to him alone. Letter, DiSalle to Kaufmann, June 17, 1953,
ODM files.
131.
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wage controls-the very heart of coordination-are beyond the authority
and power of an administrator, and many irrevocably established before
the administrator is appointed. Some of these predetermined factors
which are established in law, the Congress could be in a position to rectify
in future emergencies. 3 2 But other factors, such as collective bargaining,
are deeply imbedded in our social and economic institutions, and it is
most presumptuous to believe that they will-or should-ever be revised.
Nevertheless an economic stabilization administrator, within his limited
sphere, can aid in coordinating the price and wage programs and in
achieving a level and equity of stabilization which could not be accomplished without his efforts. 3
Prices and wages will always be "coordinated" with or without formal coordination in the sense that eventually some price-wage relationships must emerge. The task of the stabilization administrator in an
emergency controls program is to attempt to make certain that the levels
at which they are brought into equilibrium are within the stablization
limits, are equitable to the various sectors of society, are an aid to the
production program, and are workable. These objectives during the
development of a price-wage program are aided or abetted by various
factors. From experience with the institution of price-wage programs
two facts pertinent to the coordination of the direct controls program are
clear.
First, while in retrospect it is clear that many of the distortion problems both within and between the price-wage programs faced in 1951
could have been avoided if direct controls on prices and wages were immediately imposed following Korea, it was not possible to do so since
the authority was not granted by the Congress until after the first wave
132. E.g., rigid price-wage parallelism in selective controls.
133. Governor Arnall, when asked to comment on this document in draft form,
observed:
Price-wage coordination, integration and control can, and always does, degenerate into injustice, economic mockery and discrimination in favor of the
politically and economically strong and powerful unless there is a single administrator over both wages and prices with complete and absolute authority to
control, coordinate and integrate both.
The 1952 steel debacle amounted to a repetition of the 1946 history of OPA
days. The action taken in the steel case made "standards of equitability and
fairness" applicable only to the small and the weak.
In my judgment there should be one man in complete and absolute control of
prices, one man in complete and absolute control of wages, and he should be the
same person. It is futile and impossible to undertake to control wages under the
tripartite board arrangement while undertaking to control prices with one man in
complete authority.
If ever it is necessary to resort again to economic controls there ought to be
an economic czar with full power to control prices and wages. Any other solution
is no solution. Letter, Arnall to Kaufmann, June 8, 1953, ODM files.
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of the price rise. Furthermore it is questionable whether the public
appreciated the seriousness of the conflict or the dimensions of the economic problem, and whether it would have supported a full price and
wage controls program immediately after Korea.
Second, the ability of the stablization administrator to act in 1950
was unnecessarily limited by the requirement of complete price-wage
parallelism when selective controls were desirable. There are times when
immediate imposition of selective controls might forestall or obviate the
need for more extensive price or wage controls. Since selective wage
control (or decontrol) appears to be an impossibility, to require by law
that selective price control be instituted only with selective wage control
is actually to require general wage control whenever selective price control
is sought. In the 1950 situation this was not a serious problem, although
the price-wage parallelism requirement delayed some needed price action.
It would have been a most serious problem if it had been applied to the
institution of controls in World War II.
Since there is a "ratchet effect" in both price and wage control in
that it is generally impossible to carry out roll-backs, in order to do a more
effective and equitable job of holding prices and wages in balance and of
maintaining this balance at the lowest desired stabilization level, it is
most necessary to have the authority to control prices and wages at the
time the emergency occurs. This authority should not require an absolute
price-wage parallelism in the institution of controls but should leave this
alternative open. A pre-emergency base plus a differential is maintained
with a difficulty the degree of which varies in direct proportion to the
size of the differential and the length of the delay. Hence the administrator should have authority to impose controls from the very start of an
emergency. These conclusions regarding the imposition of controls may
not appear to be directly related to the problem of coordination, but they
are. The more difficult the individual programs become, the less possible it is to attempt to develop any stable relationship between them.
In the development and maintenance of the direct controls program,
it has been noted that there was, in fact, very little need for operational
relationship between the price and wage program in either the World
War II or the Korea emergency experience. The operational detachment
of the two programs appears to be desirable, despite the fact that during
an inflationary period effective price controls (including agricultural
price controls) are not possible without effective wage controls, and vice
versa. This fact must be clearly recognized not only by the price and
wage agencies, but by the Congress and all sectors of the public generally
in providing for the authority and organization of the program.
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During the controls program the task of a coordinator of price and
wage controls is to attempt to define the level and stringency of price and
wage controls being sought, and he must work with each control agency
to assure that their individual policies are mutually compatible and their
actions consistent with their goals. This, however, does not require
operational integration. The coordinator must also attempt to present
the pertinent facts and seek support for both of the programs from all
quarters of the executive departments, from the Congress, and from the
public at large.
The major problems facing stabilization administrators in regard to
the price program have been in protecting the program from weakening
amendments to the law and from increases in price required by the supply
objectives of the defense program. While many times serious and sometimes crippling, these price program problems do not pose the basic
stabilization dilemma facing the administrator, namely, the incongruity
of a tripartite wage board with both dispute and stabilization functions.
From recent experience there appears to be no simple solution-especially
in a period of partial mobilization-for effective coordination of a wage
program with the price program if one grants the necessity of a tripartite
wage board, the necessity of obtaining a firm wage policy, and of yet
maintaining the continued existence of the wage board. If the wage
board also has a disputes function, which is important for the board, the
difficulty is far greater, since there is a basic conflict between the latitude
required by a wage board in its disputes function and the difficulty which
this latitude presents in the board's maintenance of a wage policy consistent with stabilization objectives.
Because of these problems, in the environment which the Economic
Stabilization Administrator found himself in the Korea emergency program, there was relatively little that he could have done to forestall the
steel crisis. However, closer working relations with the WSB, formal
presentation by OPS to the WSB of the price problem and, above all, the
willingness of the WSB chairman to present an all public member recommendation might have lessened some of the intensity of the crisis.
It appears particularly desirable that the executive order, or the
enabling legislation, establishing the wage board require specifically that
the public members of a tripartite wage board should render an independent recommendation in dispute or wage policy matters when it appears to them that a recommendation with at least a majority of the board
within stabilization limits is not possible.
Thus during the price and wage program the coordinating function
of the administrator is one of working with both programs individually
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in the effort to keep them compatible, and of working both within and
outside of the executive branch for the greater support of both programs.
The direct controls program alone, even if without flaw, cannot withstand the inflationary pressures. An effective tax and fiscal program
must be established, the credit controls must give support to direct controls, and the production controls need adjustment to prevent unnecessary
disruption of the stabilization effort. The Economic Stabilization Administrator to live up to his name needs authority to influence all of these
economic factors. At the very least, he needs to represent in government,
and to the Congress, the direct controls concern with the development and
use of these other economic tools.
Since price and wage controls are interrelated with each other and
also interknit with the other economic controls and since all these controls
are denying or restricting individuals from actions or rewards which they
would otherwise consider their just rewards, the general success of a
stabilization effort depends upon the degree of genuine support from the
nation. In our democratic society the effectiveness of these controls
depends upon the understanding of the public of the need for the controls
and their willingness to accept them.
While public support is perhaps a result of the apparent urgency of
the crisis and the degree of inconvenience and sacrifice which it entails,
there is nonetheless an important place for executive leadership in explaining the situation to the public and engendering support which otherwise
would not be forthcoming. Both the economic stabilization administrator
and other executive leaders, including the President, have important parts
to play in this regard. In the Korea emergency period it appears that on
the one hand the public was "oversold" in that they expected too much
from the direct controls program, and that on the other hand they were
not willing to make the necessary sacrifices or support the necessary
measures which would have enabled the program to come closer to fulfilling their expectations.
An important coordinating function of the economic stabilization
administrator is, therefore, to define a fair and equitable stabilization
program, like Johnston's April, 1951, program, which is reasonably possible of attainment, unlike Johnston's April, 1951, program, and to bring
this program to the public so it can be attempted in all of its various parts.
Since there are no absolute and objective criteria of fairness and equity,
but since an unfair or inequitable program cannot be maintained, it is
most necessary for the administrator to present such an inclusive stabilization program which is reasonably fair and equitable in all of its parts and
which can obtain maximum support. If the administrator or the govern-
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ment cannot get the program accepted in all its various parts as an equitable one, the belief that the inequity exists will in fact evoke the arguments and the seeking by the "affected group" of measures to rectify the
inequity. The most favored group thus tends to establish for the administrator the level of stabilization control.
The coordinating functions of a price and wage control administrator
are far more easily conceived and stated than achieved. Our economic
system, our institutions, and our mores have been fashioned for many
years in an environment which has been free of government price or wage
controls. Only in serious emergency will people change their deeply
rooted habits and attitudes to make such controls workable. An administrator, in coordinating price and wage control programs and in attempting
to keep the programs compatible and within stabilization limits, comes
directly into conflict with these established habits and attitudes. An
administrator cannot, before he takes office, determine the condition of
the economy, the relative levels of prices and wages, the nature of collective bargaining contracts, the political equilibrium, the basic legislation,
the loyalty of the public to the program, and the many other factors which
will determine his success. He must necessarily take these factors, try to
influence them, and attempt to maintain a stabilization program within
the limitations presented him.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
FALL 1954

Volume 30

Number I

INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

STUDENT EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief
CHRISTOPHER KIRAGES

Article and Book Review Editor

Note Editor

THOMAS S. EMISON

JOHN WILLIAM KLEINDORFER

Note Editor

Note Editor

DANNY ROTENBERG

JOHN

W.

ROBERT
JAMES

BARCE

J. EDER

L.

KEALiNG

THOMAS

L.

STEVENS

ALEX JOKAY
CARL DEAN OVERHOLSER
CHARLES

R.

TIEDE

The Indiana Law Journal is published quarterly by
THE INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Editorial and Publication Office: Indiana University School of Law
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA

